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What are the intentional objects of groups’ beliefs? This paper claims that they are 
immanent facts, i.e., facts which exist only within groups’ minds. Since in relevant literature 
the notion of immanent object and the related theory of “immanent realism” arise in 
connection with the work of Franz Brentano, the paper begins by briefly sharing historical 
information on Brentano, making clear why – contrary to common belief – Brentano did 
not argue for immanent realism in his work. in a second part, i then look more closely at 
groups’ beliefs and illustrate why the insight of immanent realism – despite its historically 
inadequate reconstruction – can bear on my initial question. in doing so, i pay particular 
attention to John Searle’s theory of institutional facts, using it as a conceptual basis to 
develop my own pseudo-Brentanian approach. This approach allows me to introduce a 
further class of social entities in the last part of the paper: contrary to institutional facts 
the immanent entities of collective beliefs presuppose neither the assignment of functions 
nor the generation of deontologies, but they do presuppose groups’ beliefs for their existence. 
Being the precipitates of collective experiences, such entities are intrinsically related with 
the first plural person perspective and hence play an important role in what we may call the 
“cultural layer” of social reality.
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“[…] dornröschen und rotkäppchen sind gestalten der deutschen 
märchenwelt, die zur gemeinsamen umwelt unseres Volkes gehört. 
Keinem von uns wird es einfallen zu behaupten, daß jeder sein 
eigenes dornröschen habe. es hat seine fest umrissenen Züge, seine 
persönliche eigenart und Schicksale, an denen so wenig zu rütteln 
ist wie an denen einer historischen Persönlichkeit. Wir würden sehr 
energisch Verwahrung einlegen, wenn ihm jemand Züge andichten 
wollte, die ihm nicht zugehören. unsere märchenwelt nun hat eine 
gewisse Topyk, eine eigenart, die sie von der anderer Völker, z.B. der 
chinesischen, charakterisitisch unterscheidet.”
(stein 1922, 134-135)
in this paper i am mainly interested in the ontological status that the 
intentional objects of groups’ beliefs bear. suppose that i am a member 
of, e.g., a religious community and that i share with the members of this 
community the belief that, e.g., only someone with divine powers can be the 
leader of the community. in this scenario, what does it mean for a collective 
to share this belief? What is the object of the belief? on the one hand, the 
belief is false simply because nothing in the world makes it true. on the 
other hand, the non-existing fact that the leader has divine powers – if 
believed – produces some effects, e.g., the community respects him and/or 
only he has the right to perform given actions within the community. 
one of the assumptions that drives my argumentation is that within 
social ontology there is a distinction to be drawn between sociality and 
culturality. sociality comprehends all those entities, practices and dynamics 
which are intrinsically social and which are not culturally modifiable. In 
this sense, social notions like sincerity, victory, obligations, etc., seem to fall 
within the domain of sociality: they are not context-relative (see smith 2003) 
or do not bear “essential properties” (as phenomenologists would prefer 
to say, see salice 2012). on the contrary, culturality comprehends all those 
social entities which are intrinsic to a given culture and hence cannot exist 
outside or apart from this culture. in accordance with this idea, here i will 
claim that the objects of social and cultural beliefs belong to an ontological 
category of its own kind, i.e., they are the “immanent objects” of social 
beliefs, and that these objects partly constitute the domain of culturality.
the present article is organized as follows: since the notion of immanent 
object and the related theory of “immanent realism” arise in relevant 
literature in connection with the work of Franz Brentano, i begin (§1) by 
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briefly sharing relevant historical information on Brentano, making clear 
why – contrary to common belief – Brentano did not argue for immanent 
realism in his work. in a second part (§3), i then look more closely at cultural 
beliefs and illustrate why the insight of immanent realism – despite its 
historically inadequate reconstruction – can bear on issues related to 
the main question raised above: what are the objects of collective beliefs? 
in doing so, i pay particular attention to John searle’s theory of social 
construction, using it as a conceptual basis to develop my own pseudo-
Brentanian approach to cultural reality (§4).
the literature has employed the phrase “immanent realism” to characterize 
to characterize a phase in Brentano’s thought which more or less 
corresponds to the period in which Brentano published his groundbreaking 
monograph Psychology from empirical Standpoint (1864). among other 
merits, in this book Brentano reactivates the aristotelian-medieval 
notion of intentionality and puts it at the center of philosophical debates. 
according to roderick chisholm and a number of other commentators, the 
intentionality thesis – as Brentano introduces it in that book – strictly taken 
entails two different theses. The first is a psychological thesis which states 
that reference to an object is the distinguishing element between psychic 
and physical phenomena. all psychic phenomena, and psychic phenomena 
alone, are directed towards something. the second is an ontological thesis 
which concerns “the nature of certain objects of thought and of other 
psychological attitudes”, i.e., it concerns the ontological status of that 
“something” to which the mind is related (see chisholm 1967, 201).
according to this second thesis, for Brentano the object of an intentional 
act is an ontologically subjective entity which exists only in the mind. 
Brentano allegedly reached this insight when attempting to offer a solution 
to the problem raised by the so-called “objectless presentations”. indeed, 
immanent realism can easily account for all those cases in which an act is 
directed towards a non-existing entity: the act of thinking of Pegasus shows 
no structural difference from the act of thinking of Barack obama – in both 
cases the act of thinking is directed towards an object existing merely in the 
mind. With regard to the latter, however, it happens to be the case that this 
inner object corresponds to an actually existing object.
recently, convincing evidence has been delivered that Brentano did not 
claim such a position. scholars have presented several arguments to show 
that Brentano never accepted immanent realism (see antonelli 2012, sauer 
2006). among the reasons adduced by these authors, probably the most 
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important is that Brentano’s position did not share the modern view of 
relations as n-place predicates or properties. if the intentional relation were 
a dyadic property, then the inference from the existence of the relation to 
the existence of its relata was indeed justified. However, Brentano denies 
that the intentional relation has to be analyzed in terms of a dyadic relation 
into which the subject and the object enter, and so he was not committed to 
the idea that all intentional acts have an object of a sui generis ontological 
status. in other words, for Brentano, it does not follow that if a thinks of b, 
then both relata, a and b, exist in whatever sense of the term “existence”.
rather, Brentano understood relations in an aristotelian sense, namely 
as monadic predicates. accordingly, the fact that i think of obama, is not 
constituted by my mind, the relation of thinking and obama as object 
existing in the mind. this fact only includes my mind and the monadic 
property thinking-of-obama and it obtains regardless of whether obama 
exists or not (i.e., it does not entail the existence of an object in my mind). to 
put this point in Brentanian terms, i think of obama and not of the thought-
obama, i hear the sound and not the heard-sound, i see the object and not 
the seen-object, etc. obama, the sound, the object, etc., can be called – and 
are actually called by Brentano – the “immanent” objects of the act, but it 
should now be evident that this expression does not imply that these objects 
are in the consciousness.
to be sure, Brentano reserves an ontological niche to what he calls the act’s 
“correlates” (german: Korrelate) – that is, the aforementioned thought-
obama, heard-sound, seen-object etc. such correlates are indeed parts 
of my mind, but they are not the objects of the act. But if so, then in what 
sense are these correlates in my mind? a clear answer to this question can 
be found in Brentano’s lectures on descriptive Psychology given in Vienna 
during the 1880s and 1890s (see Brentano 1982). in these lectures Brentano 
reinforces a statement he already made in his Psychologie that all acts are 
conscious acts. not only are all acts directed towards an object, they are also 
directed towards themselves. insofar as they occur, they simultaneously 
grasp themselves and hence are conscious. suppose i am thinking of obama, 
then at the same time i know that i am thinking of obama. and the same is 
valid for all intentional acts: if i perceive or imagine obama, i know that i 
perceive or imagine obama. looking now at this second intentional relation 
in which the act grasps itself, the act encounters, on the one hand, the act’s 
component or mode (i know whether i am merely imagining obama or if i 
perceive him, etc.). But, on the other, it also encounters obama-qua-object 
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of this act, that is, it also grasps the thought-obama or the perceived-
obama. so the correlate does indeed play a role in Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality, but only a secondary one, as it were.
But if Brentano did not advocate immanent realism, then questions arise 
as to why it is important to deal systematically with this theory and why 
it is relevant for social ontology. What follows should hopefully clarify the 
answers to both questions. in short, the idea is that the beliefs of individuals 
cannot create reality. it does not follow from the fact that individuals 
take something to be true, that this something has to exist in any sense. 
the same does not hold, however, for group beliefs. if a group believes 
something, then what the group believes does exist in a perspicuous sense. 
of course, this reality is not that of brute facts; rather, what the group 
creates is a social or – probably more precisely – a cultural reality, and this is 
a reality which exists only in the group’s mind.
to illustrate this intuition, consider the following declarative sentence and 
assume that it expresses a belief:
(1) akihito is the emperor of Japan
the sentence refers to a fact (an existing state of affairs) and, hence, it is 
true. But what is its truth-maker? to answer this question, one might do 
well to distinguish between external and internal points of view, depending 
on who holds the belief expressed in the sentence. 
Following searle’s account (see searle 1995, 2010), the sentence is true because 
it refers to an institutional fact. this is not an ontologically objective fact (such 
as the one that mont Blanc is 4810m high), but an ontologically subjective one. 
if mankind were to disappear, then nations, emperors and, more generally, all 
institutional facts would disappear too. on the contrary, mont Blanc would 
still remain. 
What is then the structure of this institutional fact? What, in other words, are its 
constituents? First of all, sentence (1) suggests that the property being-emperor-
of-Japan is exemplified by an individual, i.e., by Akihito. But this suggestion is 
false, for exemplification is an objective relation which characterizes objective 
facts, whereas the fact at issue is ontologically subjective. according to this 
analysis, (1) does not linguistically depict the state of affairs at issue adequately 
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(1*) akihito counts as the emperor of Japan
the “counting as” locution should convey the idea that akihito is merely 
held as the emperor of Japan by someone. still, the question now arises as to 
what kind of predicate the “counting as” locution expresses. in particular, is 
this a dyadic predicate (see Varzi 2007)? (interestingly enough, here we come 
across a problem similar to that we discussed regarding Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality.) if the “counting as” is a dyadic predicate and if sentence (1*) 
is true, then it would follow that two objects exist: on the one hand, akihito 
and, on the other, the emperor of Japan.
But this view is not compatible with searle’s monist ontology. as he puts 
it regarding his preferred example of a 10 dollar bill: it is not the case 
that when i hold a 10 dollar bill in my hand, i hold two objects at the same 
time – the piece of paper and the dollar bill. one possibility to deal with 
this difficulty is to go for the idea that the “counting as” predicate is not 
primitive and has to be analyzed further. if x counts as y, then a given 
status – that is, a given label – is assigned by collective intentionality to x 
by means of an expressed or unexpressed speech act of declaration. the 
status or label is the y-term, and this status always goes with a certain 
function1. returning to the setting of our initial example, in Japan, if you 
are the the Tennō, you can fulfill certain functions that go with this status; 
for example, you are in charge for the convocation of the diet. since all 
status goes hand in hand with functions, searle introduces the concept of 
“status function” to refer to all those functions which can be fulfilled only 
in relation to a given status. as a consequence, the fact at hand consists of 
the status function “emperor” imposed on an individual (i.e., akihito) via 
collective intentionality. 
There are two further necessary conditions that need to be fulfilled in 
order for this fact to exist. The first are the deontologies generated by the 
status function. as searle puts it: “status functions = intentional facts → 
deontologies” (searle 2010, 23). the emperor has the right to adjourn the 
convocation of the diet, but he also has the obligation to perform ceremonial 
functions. Without such deontologies, i.e., without the rights and obligations 
connected with the status, there are no institutional facts.
1  But in some cases you only have the label without the corresponding x: in 2010 searle 
extends the domain of the notion of institutional fact by including the so-called “free-standing 
y-terms” (i.e., facts constituted only by a status function; e.g., corporations, electronic money, 
blindfold chess, etc.). accordingly, the validity of the “x counts as y”-formula is now restricted to 
a limited number of institutional facts. 
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the second condition has to do with the beliefs that the group 
entertains. if the creation of this fact goes back to the imposition 
of a status to the x-term by means of a declaration, its “continued 
existence” is secured only if a group g (for example, for argument’s 
sake, the shinto community in Japan2) believes or accepts that akihito 
is the emperor of Japan (searle 1995, 117f). here, again, if g does not 
believe/accept that akihito is the emperor of Japan, the institutional 
fact at issue does not exist.
We have now found an answer to our initial question: to what state of 
affairs does the belief expressed by sentence (1) refer? the answer is: the 
belief is directed towards a complex entity (a status function assigned to 
an individual via collective intentionality) which exists only as long as 
the two aforementioned conditions are fulfilled. Since this state of affairs 
subsists, sentence (1) is true . note, however, that the sentence analyzed so far 
expresses the belief of an external observer and that the state of affairs at hand 
is the intentional object of this particular belief. to make this clear, let’s have 
a look at the second necessary condition, namely, at the group’s beliefs.
What about the belief of group g? to what fact does sentence (1) refer, if this 
sentence is taken to express the belief of g? When g believes that akihito is the 
emperor, g believes that akihito has a divine nature. since for g being-the-Tennō 
is co-referential with the property being an individual with divine nature (the 
senses of these predicates differ, but their objectual domain coincide), for g 
sentence (1) refers to the very same state of affairs as sentence (2):
(2) akihito has divine nature
in other words, for g, “emperor” does not point primarily to a status function, 
but to a non-institutional concept. hence, the belief of g and that of the 
external observer are not directed towards the same state of affairs. For the 
external observer defines the concept “emperor” only in terms of deontic 
powers and deontologies (see “[...] the [status] function is defined in terms of 
[deontic] power [...]”, Searle 1997, 451), whereas G defines this concept by virtue 
of properties which are taken to be objective. For g, to be the descendant of 
the gods is not a socially construed fact: rather, the emperor is held to be the 
lineal descendent of the gods by means of natural kinship (see maraini 2003). 
2  only sociological research can ascertain whether or not there is a shinto community in Japan 
which bears such belief, so this example may very well be fictional. Still, this does not seem to be 
relevant for the conceptual consequences to be drawn from it.
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thus, the object of g’s belief is not an institutional, i.e., a socially construed, 
fact: the group does not believe that (1) is true by means of social agreement. 
Furthermore – under the plausible assumption that no man has divine nature 
– there is also no objective state of affairs to which g’s belief refers.
according to this last point, if we take (1) to express g’s belief, (1) is false. 
still, this belief contributes to the constitution of an institutional fact. let 
me stress at this point that it is not the belief as such that brings about the 
institutional fact, but this very particular belief, namely the belief in the fact 
that akihito has divine nature. (the group may have thousands of other 
beliefs about akihito, but only if it believes that akihito has divine nature, is 
akihito the emperor of Japan.) accordingly, the sentence 
(3) g believes that akihito has divine nature
has to be in any case true for the corresponding institutional fact (expressed 
by (1*)) to exist. in other words, if sentence (3) were false (if g does not 
believe that akihito has divine nature), then sentence (1*) would be false, 
too. to be sure, one could try to get rid of the linguistic reference to the non-
existing fact enclosed in (3) by applying some sort of paraphrastic strategy. 
Following russell’s suggestion, (3) could be paraphrased into:
(3*) there exists an x such that (i) g has a belief about x, (ii) x has 
divine nature and (iii) there is only one such x 
But since x has no values, sentence (3*) is obviously false. here i am not 
concerned with those cases in which individuals instead of collectives 
are mentioned in clause (i): it may very well be that the paraphrase 
works for this kind of case. still, in the scenario at issue (3*) cannot be 
an adequate paraphrase of (3) since, as searle points out, (3) captures a 
necessary condition for the existence of the corresponding institutional 
fact. indeed institutional facts exist only in virtue of the beliefs of a 
community. But then, if (3) has to be true, what does g believe, when it 
believes that akihito is the emperor?
as suggested earlier in the paper, i contend that the object of g’s belief is a 
fact which (subjectively) exists only as long as the corresponding experience 
exists. this entity exists in the group’s mind and nowhere else and can be 
characterized as “immanent” in a pseudo-Brentanian terminology. Just 
as dornröschen and rotkäppchen have their own reality (their “definitely 
4. 
Immanent 
Entities and the 
Cultural Layer of 
Social Reality
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contoured traits [seine fest umrissenen Züge]”), but these figures existentially 
depend on the experiences of a group and not of that of an individual (in this 
case: on the fantasies of the german Volk), so the divine emperor of Japan (or 
more precisely: the fact that someone is the divine emperor of Japan) exists 
only in relation to the beliefs of a group.
this idea leads to an important consequence. remember that immanent 
realism holds that immanent entities may or may not correspond to 
transcendent entities and that this does not make any structural difference 
for the belief of the individual. this idea can now be exploited in the 
case of group beliefs: immanent entities can correspond to transcendent 
(institutional or natural) entities, but this does not make any difference for 
the group’s experience. nothing in the experience varies if its object does or 
does not exist. let’s discuss this point a bit further.
We have already dealt with the scenario in which the group believes that 
being-the-emperor and having-divine-nature are natural properties of 
akihito. here the immanent fact does not correspond to an objective or 
natural fact – for no such facts exist at all. But it does not correspond to an 
institutional fact either: although the institutional fact (subjectively) exists 
and although the immanent fact (together with the concomitant belief) is 
a necessary condition for its existence, g’s belief is not concerned with this 
institutional fact. For what g intends, when it intends that akihito is the 
emperor, is not what an external observer intends, when s/he intends that 
akihito counts as the emperor. as we saw, sentence (1) is true if it expresses 
the belief of an external observer, but it is false if it expresses the belief of g.
so now one can modify this scenario by assuming that there is a group 
of social scientists (g’) and that g’ agrees with searle’s theory. assume 
furthermore that g’ knows that “emperor” is a status function and that it 
assigns this status function to searle himself. in this example it happens 
to be the case that the immanent fact believed by g’ corresponds to an 
institutional fact. in other words, the fact believed by g’ corresponds to a 
given segment of institutional reality. as a consequence, the sentence
(4) searle is the emperor
is true if we take it to express either the belief of an external observer or the 
belief of g’. still, the immanent and the institutional facts at issue are and 
remain ontologically different. this last point also tells us that the existence 
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of a transcendent fact (be it institutional or objective/natural3) does not 
make any structural difference for the belief of the group and that the group 
can be acquainted only with immanent entities. at this juncture, the central 
question raises as to how the term “belief” is employed here and whether 
the beliefs of individuals have the same features of group beliefs. i would 
answer this second question in the negative, i.e., beliefs of individuals can be 
acquainted with transcendent entities, but a discussion of this aspect would 
exceed the scope and purpose of this paper.
to conclude: in addition to institutional facts, in this paper i claimed that 
there is a further class of social entities which presuppose neither the 
assignment of functions nor the generation of deontologies, but which 
do presuppose collective beliefs (or group beliefs) for their existence. as 
these are merely the ontological precipitates of intentional experiences, 
as it were, such entities taken per se are not causally active. only together 
with their corresponding beliefs do these facts have social effects. Being 
so intrinsically related with the first person plural perspective, they play 
an important role in what we may call the “cultural layer” of social reality. 
and indeed they constitute – at least an important domain of – this layer. 
to repeat the intuition that lead this analysis, we can say that the beliefs 
of individuals cannot create reality, but that of groups can. however, rigid 
ontological limits have to be set here as the only entities that these beliefs 
may create are “immanent” entities, i.e., entities which exist only in the 
group mind.
3  Obviously enough, the scenario at hand can be again modified by taking natural facts into 
account. if g believes that there is snow on the mont Blanc, the immanent object of this belief 
corresponds to a natural fact if there actually is snow on the mont Blanc.
alessandro salice universität Wien 
soCial ontoloGy anD iMManent RealisM
92
REFERENCES
antonelli, m. (2012), “Franz Brentano’s intentionality thesis”, in a. salice 
(ed.): intentionality, Philosophia (Basic Philosophical concepts), munich, 2012;
salice, a. (2012), “social ontology as embedded in the tradition of realist 
Phenomenology”, in m. schmitz, h.B. schmid et al. (eds): The Background of 
Social reality, springer, dordrecht, 2012;
Brentano, F. (11874, 21924), Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. With 
introduction and notes by o. Kraus, 2 vols., meiner, leipzig; 
Brentano, F. (1982), deskriptive Psychologie, eds. by r. m. chisholm and W. 
Baumgartner, meiner, hamburg, 1982; 
chisholm, r. (1967), “intentionality”, in P. edwards (ed.): encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 4., mcmillan, new york, 1967, 201-204.
maraini, F. (2003), l’agape Celeste. i riti di consacrazione del sovrano giapponese, 
luni editrice, milano, 2003.
sauer, W. (2006), “die einheit der intentionalitätskonzeption bei Franz 
Brentano”, grazer Philosophische Studien 73, 2006, 1-26;
searle, J. (1995), The Construction of Social reality, the Free Press, new york, 
1995;
searle, J. (1997), “responses to critics of The Construction of Social reality”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological research 57-2, 1997, 449-458;
searle, J. (2010), making the Social World. The Structure of human Civilization, 
oxford university Press, oxford, 2010;
smith, B. (2003), “the ontology of social reality”, american Journal of 
economics and Sociology, Vol. 62-1, 2003, 285-299;
stein, e. (1922), “Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie 
und der geisteswissenschaften”, in e. husserl (ed.), Jahrbuch für Philosophie 
und phänomenologische Forschung, Jg. 5, niemeyer Verlag, halle, pp. 
1-284. new edition: stein, e., Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der 
Psychologie und der geisteswissenschaften (edited by B. Beckmann-Zöller), 
in e. stein, edith stein gesamtausgabe, Vol. 6, herder, Freiburg 2010;
Varzi, a. (2007), il denaro è un’opera d’arte (o quasi). ciclo di conferenze e 
seminari “l’uomo e il denaro”. Quaderno 24. università cattolica del sacro 
cuore, milano, 2007.
alessandro salice universität Wien 
soCial ontoloGy anD iMManent RealisM
